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COMMENTS
PPACA AND THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE:
A HEALTHY APPROACH TO SEVERABILITY
Jenna L. Kamiat*
In 2010, Congress passed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act, legislation designed to comprehensively reform the U.S. health care
system. Soon after the law’s passage, several lawsuits challenged the
constitutionality of the individual mandate, a key provision requiring nearly
every American to carry a minimum level of health insurance or face a
penalty. Courts have split on whether the individual mandate is outside the
scope of Congress’s constitutional authority, and those that have struck
down the provision have had to address what fate should befall the
remainder of the law.
Severability doctrine is the exclusive mechanism for the courts to deal
with questions of partial unconstitutionality in statutes. As of this writing,
three courts have addressed the mandate’s severability. All have come to
divergent conclusions on if, and how much of, the law can be allowed to
stand if the mandate is excised.
This Comment analyzes the split of authority regarding the severability
of the individual mandate. It asserts that the approach taken by the
Eleventh Circuit—striking the mandate while leaving the remainder of the
law intact—is the appropriate course of action for the Supreme Court if it
finds that the mandate is unconstitutional. This Comment concludes that
the judiciary would overstep its constitutional boundaries if it were to strike
additional provisions of PPACA, and that any subsequent re-working of the
Act is a task reserved for the legislature.
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INTRODUCTION
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 1 (PPACA or the Act)
was enacted in order to confront a “profound and enduring crisis” in the
health care industry. 2 Using a comprehensive scheme of tax measures and
economic regulations, the legislation seeks to improve the universal
availability of affordable health care, to furnish protections to consumers
against discriminatory underwriting practices of insurance companies, and
to reduce the amount of uncompensated medical care.3
In March 2010, President Obama signed PPACA into law, marking the
most significant advance in health care policy since the creation of
Medicare and Medicaid in 1965. 4 But the reform “divided Americans like
few other issues in recent memory,” and led to one of the “longest, most
rancorous and most partisan debates” seen by Congress in years.5
PPACA’s emergence as a highly contentious object of public debate is
due in great part to its minimum coverage provision 6—the so-called
1. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), as amended by the Health Care and
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-152 (2010) (codified as amended in
scattered titles of U.S.C.). These two statutes are collectively known as PPACA, and will be
referred to as such throughout this Comment in order to designate the health care legislation
and its amendments.
2. Consolidated Brief for Respondents at 2, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, --S. Ct. --- (2011) (Nos. 11-393, 11-400), 2011 WL 4941020, at *2; see also Dan Balz,
Introduction to WASH. POST, LANDMARK: THE INSIDE STORY OF AMERICA’S NEW HEALTHCARE LAW AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR US ALL 1, 4–6 (2010) [hereinafter LANDMARK] (tracing
the origins of the health care debate to Theodore Roosevelt’s call for nationalized health
insurance during his 1912 presidential bid, and noting its omnipresence in public policy
discussions ever since).
3. Consolidated Brief for Respondents, supra note 2, at 2–3.
4. Balz, supra note 2, at 1.
5. Id. at 1–2. For a comprehensive discussion of the political forces that shaped the
debate, see generally Ceci Connolly, Part I: How We Got Here, in LANDMARK, supra note 2.
6. T.R. Goldman, Health Policy Brief: Legal Challenges to Health Reform, HEALTH
AFF. (Nov. 30, 2011), available at http://www.healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief_
pdfs/healthpolicybrief_58.pdf.
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individual mandate. 7 Many have argued that Congress overstepped its
constitutional boundaries in passing PPACA, 8 and various suits specifically
challenging the validity of the individual mandate have commenced. 9 As
these challenges move through the judicial process, courts have disagreed
on the primary issue of whether the minimum coverage provision of
PPACA is a constitutional exercise of legislative power. 10
The subsidiary issue of severability has been equally disputed yet less
frequently discussed. Severability doctrine guides the judiciary when
courts are faced with a statute that may be partially valid and partially
invalid. 11 The inquiry is whether the valid components of a statute may be
enforced separately from its invalid provisions, or whether a finding of
partial unconstitutionality affects the legislation such that it must fail in its
entirety. 12 Such a determination is second in importance only to the initial
assessment of constitutionality, 13 particularly in the case of PPACA, where
the viability of an entire legislative scheme may turn on the constitutionality
of a single provision. 14
On November 14, 2011, the Supreme Court granted review of the
Eleventh Circuit’s decision on both issues: the constitutionality of the
individual mandate and its severability. 15 In March 2012, the Court heard a
virtually unprecedented five-and-a-half hours of oral argument regarding
the constitutionality of the individual mandate, including ninety minutes of
argument about whether the remainder of the law may stand if the provision
is struck. 16 The Court is expected to issue its ruling in June 2012.17
The Court must ascertain whether finding the individual mandate
unconstitutional so affects the functionality of PPACA that either the entire
law must fall or certain related provisions must be struck down alongside it.
7. PPACA § 1501, 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (Supp. IV 2010). For an explanation of the
individual mandate provision, see infra Part I.C.1.
8. Wilson Huhn, Constitutionality of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
Under the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause, 32 J. LEGAL MED. 139,
143 (2011).
9. See, e.g., id. at 142–43; Bryan J. Leitch, Where Law Meets Politics: Freedom of
Contract, Federalism, and the Fight over Health Care, 27 J.L. & POL. 177, 178–79 (2011);
Ben Pershing, Opponents of Health-Reform Bill Look to Supreme Court; Mandate Is
Questioned; Democrats Dismiss Constitutionality Issue, WASH. POST, Jan. 3, 2010, at A3;
Warren Richey, Attorneys General in 11 States Poised to Challenge Healthcare Bill,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Mar. 22, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2010/
0322/Attorneys-general-in-11-states-poised-to-challenge-healthcare-bill.
10. For a summary of the pending litigation, see infra notes 142–46, 148 and
accompanying text.
11. 2 NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 44:1 (7th ed. 2009); see infra Part I.A.
12. 2 SINGER & SINGER, supra note 11, § 44:1.
13. Id.
14. Ryan M. Scoville, The New General Common Law of Severability 3 (Marquette
Univ. Law Sch., Legal Studies Working Paper No. 11-22, 2011), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1939944.
15. Florida ex rel Att’y Gen. v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th
Cir.), cert granted, 132 S. Ct. 603 (2011).
16. See Goldman, supra note 6.
17. Id.
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The lower courts have adopted sharply disparate lines of reasoning on this
issue, and this split of authority has created substantial uncertainty about the
future of health care reform—specifically, which aspects of the law will
remain applicable if the Supreme Court finds the provision to be
unconstitutional. 18 The Court’s decision will have important ramifications
for the severability of complex and highly specialized legislation, and is an
important aspect of the debate surrounding health care reform.
Two fundamental points of contention are (1) whether the individual
mandate is so integral to PPACA that the law cannot fulfill its legislative
purpose in the mandate’s absence and therefore must be found
inseverable, 19 and (2) alternatively, if the individual mandate is so closely
linked to the guaranteed issue and preexisting condition provisions that a
finding of unconstitutionality would require all three provisions to be
excised. 20 This Comment addresses the split of authority regarding these
issues.
In Part I, this Comment explains the current state of the Supreme Court’s
severability jurisprudence and surveys the recent landscape of health care
reform. Part II surveys the split of authority regarding the individual
mandate’s severability, as well as its ramifications for related provisions
and for the law as a whole. This part explores the divergent arguments that
have emerged regarding the application of severability doctrine, and how
courts have undertaken the severability analysis in the context of PPACA
and the individual mandate. Finally, Part III argues that, if found
unconstitutional, the individual mandate is severable, meaning that the
balance of PPACA should remain valid as law. This part contends that
striking additional provisions of the Act would be an inappropriate, quasilegislative act irreconcilable with severability’s fundamental notions of
judicial restraint and separation of powers.
Upon a finding of
unconstitutionality, any required rebalancing of the Act should be left to
Congress.
I. SEVERABILITY AND HEALTH CARE REFORM
In order to understand the present disagreement over the individual
mandate’s severability, it is essential to review the Supreme Court’s
approach to the doctrine as well as the principal political and cultural
dynamics informing the health care debate. Although the elements of
severability analysis are clearly delineated, the doctrine’s application is
plagued by practical difficulties. Part I.A begins by providing an
explanation of severability doctrine, and details the standards for
severability analysis as enunciated and applied by the Supreme Court. This
discussion highlights the lack of clarity and inconsistency in the Court’s
severability jurisprudence to provide context for the stark differences in
18. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 9, Sebelius, 648 F.3d 1235 (No. 11-393), 2011 WL
4479107, at *9.
19. See infra Part II.A.
20. See infra Part II.B.
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how lower courts have applied the doctrine to PPACA. Part I.B then briefly
reviews the background of health care reform—notably, the concerns
leading up to the passage of PPACA and the individual mandate. Finally,
Part I.C outlines the key provisions of PPACA that are under scrutiny,
focusing on the individual mandate and related insurance reforms. 21
A. An Overview of Severability
1. Severability Doctrine Generally
A law is rarely unconstitutional in its entirety. 22 The doctrine of
severability governs whether a court may separate, or “sever,” the
unconstitutional provisions or applications of a law, effectively excising
them such that the constitutional provisions of the statute may remain in
force. 23 This doctrinal inquiry is the exclusive mechanism by which courts
grapple with issues of partial unconstitutionality in legislation. 24 Any
finding that a statute is partially unconstitutional necessitates an inquiry into
what will become of its constitutionally valid remainder; 25 thus, severability
has a “long pedigree,” and has evolved into an integral and pervasive
component of judicial review of any statutory scheme. 26 The applicability
of sweeping legislative schemes may ultimately depend on the severability
of one unconstitutional provision.27
When undertaking a severability analysis, courts endeavor to determine
whether a statute may remain in effect, and to what extent, if a portion of it
is found to be unconstitutional.28 The inquiry is guided by several
interrelated concepts of statutory construction.29 The cornerstone of these
principles is that statutes should be interpreted to preserve their

21. This Comment does not analyze the constitutionality of the individual mandate, or
PPACA’s ability to achieve health care reform. Rather, this Comment focuses on providing
a general overview of severability with an emphasis on how its principles have been (and
should be) applied in a severability analysis of the individual mandate.
22. Kevin C. Walsh, Partial Unconstitutionality, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 738, 739 (2010).
23. Id. at 740.
24. Id. at 745; see 2 SINGER & SINGER, supra note 11, § 44:20 (noting that since
“legislative activity [is] rapidly expanding, many enactments will contain questionable
elements,” giving severability an “increasingly important role” in litigation); see also supra
notes 12–13 and accompanying text.
25. See, e.g., Walsh, supra note 22, at 741 (asserting that, “[s]een or unseen, severability
doctrine is omnipresent in judicial review as currently understood,” and that “every holding
of partial unconstitutionality that does not lead to total invalidation necessarily rests on
severability, implicitly if not explicitly”); Scoville, supra note 14, at 3 (noting that “[t]he
doctrine is frequently relevant because any holding of a statute’s partial invalidity will give
rise to questions concerning what to do with the valid remainder”).
26. Walsh, supra note 22, at 739–40 (tracing the origins of severability jurisprudence to
Marbury v. Madison).
27. Scoville, supra note 14, at 3 (stating that severability “doctrine is powerful because
the viability of large statutory schemes can hinge entirely on whether or not an
unconstitutional component is severable”).
28. John C. Nagle, Severability, 72 N.C. L. REV. 203, 204 (1993).
29. 2 SINGER & SINGER, supra note 11, § 44:1.
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constitutionality whenever possible. 30 Courts are encouraged to exercise
prudence and restraint when conducting inquiries into severability, guided
by the idea that findings of constitutional invalidity “frustrate[] the intent of
the elected representatives of the people” such that courts should “refrain
from invalidating more of the statute than is necessary.” 31 The current
test 32 requires courts to discern what the legislature would have done, rather
than what it actually did. 33 Such a determination can be highly
speculative 34 and stands in stark contrast to the nature of most other
interpretive inquiries.35 Thus, severability doctrine confers a substantial
amount of discretion on the judiciary, potentially permitting courts to
declare entire laws unconstitutional that are only partially invalid.36
Nevertheless, courts generally presume severability, acknowledging their
obligation to uphold portions of legislation whenever they can be separated
from those that are invalid. 37
Courts and commentators have disagreed over the manner in which these
principles have developed and been applied, generating scholarly criticism
The
of severability doctrine on virtually every plausible basis. 38
jurisprudence is murky in this area, as the Supreme Court has not always
explained its enunciated severability standards, laying out conclusive
rejections or presumptions with little indication of the underlying rationale,
and “offer[ing] little explanation of why certain presumptions are
warranted, how they operate, or how they relate to each other.”39
30. Id.; see also El Paso & Ne. Ry. Co. v. Gutierrez, 215 U.S. 87, 96 (1909) (“[I]t is the
duty of the court, where it can do so without doing violence to the terms of an act, to
construe it so as to maintain its constitutionality.”).
31. Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 652–53 (1984) (plurality opinion); see also
Michael D. Shumsky, Severability, Inseverability, and the Rule of Law, 41 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 227, 240–41 (2004).
32. See infra notes 54–61 and accompanying text.
33. Walsh, supra note 22, at 740.
34. Id. at 749 (“Excision requires deployment of a destructive doctrine that is subject to
manipulation because of the counterfactual speculation that it requires.”).
35. See id. at 740–41.
36. See id.
37. 2 SINGER & SINGER, supra note 11, § 44:1; see also El Paso & Ne. Ry. Co. v.
Gutierrez, 215 U.S. 87, 96 (1909) (“[W]henever an act of Congress contains unobjectionable
provisions separable from those found to be unconstitutional, it is the duty of this court to so
declare, and to maintain the act in so far as it is valid.”).
38. See Mark L. Movsesian, Severability in Statutes and Contracts, 30 GA. L. REV. 41,
41–42 (1995) (noting that academic criticism has designated severability doctrine as
simultaneously being “too malleable and as too rigid; as encouraging judicial overreaching
and as encouraging judicial abdication,” as reliant and as indifferent to legislative intent, as
too attentive and too inattentive to political concerns, and as generally lacking of “any
coherent explanation”); Robert L. Stern, Separability and Separability Clauses in the
Supreme Court, 51 HARV. L. REV. 76, 76–77 (1937) (explaining that the Supreme Court
fluctuated between negative and positive severability presumptions, employed conflicting
rules inconsistently and without explanation, and disregarded explicit manifestations of
Congress’s wishes). Stern’s article is widely acknowledged as the seminal work on
severability. See Walsh, supra note 22, at 749.
39. Nagle, supra note 28, at 218; see also id. at 225 (“The confusion surrounding
presumptions and the absence of a consistent effort to explain how severability fits within
broader theories of judicial review and statutory construction has left all of the various tests

2012]

SEVERABILITY OF PPACA’S INDIVIDUAL MANDATE

2243

Consequently, severability doctrine has varied considerably over time with
little context for its ideological shifts,40 and lower courts have struggled to
apply the doctrine uniformly.
The severability inquiry is “eased” when Congress specifically includes a
severability clause in the body of a statute. 41 A severability clause “creates
a presumption that Congress did not intend the validity of the statute in
question to depend on the validity of the constitutionally offensive
provision.” 42 Conversely, if Congress fails to include a severability clause,
its absence does not raise a presumption against severability; the silence is
“just that—silence.” 43 The absence of a severability clause may take on
greater significance when one is included in earlier versions of the bill, but
is later removed, but such an occurrence is also not dispositive.44
Consequently, the Court maintains its focus on extrinsic indications of
legislative intent and on the practical and functional viability of the postseverance statutory scheme. 45 A severability clause is therefore not
dispositive of the issue, and merely “preserves the general presumption of
severability.” 46
2. Severability Jurisprudence
The seminal case articulating the contemporary approach to
severability 47 is Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock. 48 Members of the airline
industry challenged a legislative veto provision in the Employee Protection
Program (EPP) duty-to-hire section of the Airline Deregulation Act of
used over the years unanchored by a principled approach.”); Shumsky, supra note 31, at
242–43 (suggesting that in the Alaska Airlines decision, “[a]s was typical of its prior
jurisprudence in the area, the Court spent little time justifying the severability tests it
enunciated”). Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 686 (1987), articulates the
contemporary approach to severability, and is discussed in further detail infra at note 48 and
accompanying text. See also Stern, supra note 38, at 78 (“Only if the apparent
inconsistencies in Supreme Court [severability] decisions are exposed and explained, as they
have not been by the Court itself, can a conscious effort be made to formulate
understandable and sensible principles for the future.”).
40. See Scoville, supra note 14, at 4. For further discussion on the inconsistent
development of severability doctrine, see Nagle, supra note 28, at 218 (discussing the
Court’s historical fluctuation between employing a presumption of severability versus one of
inseverability); Shumsky, supra note 31, at 232, 245 (noting the Court’s historical tendency
to disregard severability clauses).
41. Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 686.
42. Id.; see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 932 (1983); Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corp.
Comm’n of Okla., 286 U.S. 210, 234 (1932).
43. Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 686; see also Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 684
(1971) (“[T]he absence of an express severability provision in the Act [does not] dictate the
demise of the entire statute.”).
44. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Family Research Council in Support of
Appellees/Cross-Appellants and Affirmance in Part at 22–23, Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v.
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (2011) (Nos. 11-11021, 11-11067),
2011 WL 2530503, at *22–23.
45. See Shumsky, supra note 31, at 230.
46. Id. at 243.
47. See id. at 241 (referring to Alaska Airlines as the Court’s “leading contemporary
opinion on severability”).
48. 480 U.S. 678 (1987).
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1978. 49 These plaintiffs argued that the veto was unconstitutional, and that
the entire EPP section of the Act needed to be invalidated as a result.50 The
Court first looked to the relevant section’s language and structure, and
determined that the duty-to-hire provision was sufficiently detailed and
clear to stand on its own, independent of its accompanying provisions.51
The Court then examined the statute’s legislative history, and, based on the
relative unimportance of the legislative veto during congressional hearings,
concluded that Congress would have enacted the rest of the EPP as well as
the entire Airline Deregulation Act regardless of a legislative veto
provision. 52
Two decades later, in Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New
England, 53 the Supreme Court articulated three interrelated principles that
should inform any analysis of severability:
First, [courts should] try not to nullify more of a legislature’s work
than is necessary. . . .
Second, mindful that [the court’s] constitutional mandate and
institutional competence are limited, [courts] restrain [them]selves from
“rewrit[ing] law to conform it to constitutional requirements” even as we
try to salvage it. . . .
Third, the touchstone for any decision about remedy is legislative
intent, for a court “cannot use its remedial powers to circumvent the intent
of the legislature.” 54

The inquiry into legislative intent is pivotal for a determination of
severability. 55 A court must therefore examine whether the legislature
would have preferred what is left of the statute to no statute at all.56 This
well-established test stipulates that “[u]nless it is evident that the
Legislature would not have enacted those provisions which are within its
power, independently of that which is not, the invalid part may be dropped
if what is left is fully operative as a law.” 57 In other words, the
unconstitutional provision must be severed (and the remainder of the law
left in force), unless the resulting statutory scheme is one that the legislature
would not have enacted, or that is incapable of functioning independently. 58
This test further stipulates that courts must probe beyond whether the
remainder of the statute is capable of functioning as a practical matter, to
whether the remainder of the statute will “function in a manner consistent
49. Id. at 680–81.
50. Id. at 683.
51. Id. at 687–91.
52. See id. at 692–97; Shumsky, supra note 31, at 242.
53. 546 U.S. 320, 329 (2006) (quoting Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. 383,
397 (1988); Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 94 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part)).
54. Id. at 329–30.
55. See id. at 330; Walsh, supra note 22, at 740.
56. See Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 330; Walsh, supra note 22, at 740.
57. Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 684 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 421 U.S. 1, 108 (1976)
(per curiam)).
58. See id.
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with the intent of Congress.” 59 Thus, courts must ascertain whether or not
the remaining provisions of the legislation can achieve their congressional
purpose. 60 In ascertaining legislative intent, the Court looks to the language
and structure of the law, as well as its legislative history. 61
The Court in Ayotte went on to hold that wholesale invalidation of the
New Hampshire law under scrutiny was an inappropriate remedy. 62 The
Court held that application of New Hampshire’s statute would only create
constitutional issues in a few instances, and injunctive relief could have
been crafted more modestly to enjoin the statute’s application in those
limited instances, so long as such relief remained faithful to the intent of
New Hampshire’s legislature in enacting the statute.63
The Supreme Court’s decision in New York v. United States 64 further
contributed to its severability jurisprudence, and is particularly instructive
with respect to the divergence over PPACA’s individual mandate. A
challenge was brought regarding a provision of the Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Policy Act, which required states to properly dispose of waste
generated within the state, or be forced to assume title to it and be held
liable for any damages resulting from its non-disposal. 65 The Court
concluded that the provision was unconstitutional, but held that it could be
severed from the rest of the Act. 66
In that instance, Congress had enacted a comprehensive scheme to
address the lack of regulation of radioactive waste.67 The Court reasoned
that “[c]ommon sense” suggests that if Congress creates a legislative
scheme for a particular and explicit purpose, and that scheme includes
various provisions operating to achieve that purpose, “the invalidation of
one [provision] should not ordinarily cause Congress’ overall intent to be
frustrated.” 68 Without a “take title” provision, the Act could still operate in
accordance with Congress’s overall objective of encouraging states to
regulate low-level radioactive waste within their borders, because the Act
contained a variety of other incentives targeted toward furtherance of that
goal. 69 When the purpose of a statute is not defeated by invalidation of the
offensive provision, the Court concluded, the remainder of the legislation
should remain in force. 70
59. Id.
60. Id.; see also Goudy-Bachman v. U.S. Dep’t. of Health & Human Servs., 1:10-CV763, 2011 WL 4072875, at *19 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 13, 2011).
61. Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 687.
62. See Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 331 (2006). The
statute in question prohibited doctors from performing abortions on pregnant minors until 48
hours after written notice of a pending abortion was delivered to a parent or guardian. Id. at
323–24.
63. Id. at 330–31.
64. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
65. Id. at 149–54.
66. Id. at 186.
67. Id. at 150–51.
68. Id. at 186.
69. Id. at 187.
70. See id.
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The Court most recently echoed and applied its severability principles in
Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board.71
The case involved a challenge to the provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 that created the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
(Board). 72 Members of the Board were to be appointed by the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC), though the SEC was precluded from
later removing these members except for good cause. 73 The petitioners
claimed that this system violated principles of separation of powers,
affording members of the Board two-layer insulation from the President.74
In other words, the petitioners claimed that the statute violated the
Constitution because the SEC could not remove Board members except for
cause, and, in turn, the President could not remove SEC Commissioners
except for cause. 75 Thus, the petitioners argued that members of the Board
were delegated executive power but immunized from presidential control.76
The petitioners contended that this arrangement was contrary to Article II’s
vesting of the executive power in the President, 77 and, accordingly,
rendered the Board and “all power and authority exercised by it”
unconstitutional. 78 Both the district court and court of appeals found the
removal provisions permissible, 79 and thus did not reach the question of
severability.
The Supreme Court disagreed with the petitioners’ chosen remedy of
wholesale invalidation, finding the removal provisions unconstitutional, but
rejecting the contention that the constitutional violation undermined the
entire existence of the Board. 80 The Court asserted that, after excising the
invalid removal restrictions, the SEC could remove Board members at will,
leaving only one permissible level of “good-cause tenure” between the
President and the Board. 81 Accordingly, the Court reasoned that the
removal provisions were severable, and that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
remained “fully operative as a law” with the offensive provisions excised.82
Thus, absent evidence that Congress would not have enacted SarbanesOxley without the removal provisions, the Court was bound to uphold the
remainder of the law because it was capable of functioning independently. 83
The Court acknowledged that a variety of remedies could have been
employed to remedy the constitutional violation, such as judicially re71. 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010).
72. See id. at 3149.
73. Id. at 3147–48.
74. See id. at 3149.
75. See id. at 3148–49.
76. See id. at 3149.
77. See id. at 3147 (holding that the President’s constitutional obligation to oversee the
faithful execution of laws is impaired when an officer with delegated executive authority has
multilevel protection from removal).
78. See id. at 3161.
79. See id. at 3149.
80. See id. at 3161.
81. Id.
82. Id. (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 186 (1992)).
83. See id. at 3161–62.
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working the duties of the Board to modify its classification under the
Constitution, restricting the enforcement powers of the Board, or asserting
that Board members could be removable by the President in the future. 84
However, the Court emphasized that its inquiry was limited to questions of
legislative severability; a holding more extensive than that would violate
principles of judicial restraint and encroach upon the powers and
responsibilities of Congress. 85 The Court noted that Congress could
subsequently revise the legislation if it was displeased with the resulting,
post-excision statute. 86
B. Health Care Reform
Prior to PPACA’s enactment, the health insurance market was
characterized by rapidly rising costs and diminishing participation. 87 The
number of uninsured individuals in the United States has increased almost
every year, rising by 8 million in the past decade, largely due to the
escalating cost of maintaining health care coverage. 88 Commentators
attributed non-participation to the insurance industry’s profit-seeking
strategies—namely, medical underwriting and discrimination based upon
preexisting conditions.89
A principal impetus for health care reform was the exclusionary effect of
health-status underwriting practices employed by the private insurance
industry. 90 In general, private insurance could companies either flatly deny
coverage to individuals with preexisting conditions, 91 or offer such
individuals coverage at prohibitively higher premiums. 92 This policy
effectively excluded both impoverished and unhealthy individuals from

84. Id. at 3162.
85. See id.
86. Id.
87. Nan D. Hunter, Health Insurance Reform and Intimations of Citizenship, 159 U. PA.
L. REV. 1955, 1973–74 (2011) (noting that increases in insurance premiums outpaced the
rate of growth in income, and that, in 2007, forty-six million individuals were uninsured and
one in four households elected not to pursue “medical care due to cost”); see also Amy
Goldstein, Priority One: Expanding Coverage, in LANDMARK, supra note 2, at 73, 75.
88. Goldstein, supra note 87, at 75.
89. Hunter, supra note 87, at 1974. Medical underwriting is the process by which
insurance providers determine and assign risk for particular policies—a costly process in
itself which contributes to high premiums. Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae
Supporting Complete Severability (Severability) at 26, Florida ex rel Att’y Gen. v. Dep’t of
Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (2011) (Nos. 11-393, 11-400), 2012 WL 588458, at
*26.
90. See Lawrence O. Gostin & Elenora E. Connors, Health Care Reform in Transition:
Insurance Reform Without an Individual Mandate, 303 JAMA 1188, 1188 (2010), available
at http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1382&context=facpub;
see also Hunter, supra note 87, at 1973 (“Expanding access to coverage required reforming
two profit-boosting strategies that underlay these problems [of rising costs and diminishing
participation]: medical underwriting and discrimination based on preexisting conditions.”).
91. Patients are deemed to have preexisting conditions when they receive a diagnosis or
treatment for a medical condition or illness prior to seeking coverage. Gostin & Connors,
supra note 90, at 1188; Hunter, supra note 87, at 1974–75.
92. See Gostin & Connors, supra note 90, at 1188; Hunter, supra note 87, at 1974.
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obtaining insurance coverage by either pricing them out of the market or by
an outright denial. 93
Reform efforts also targeted rapidly rising costs, specifically the costs
resulting from consumption of medical services by the uninsured.94
Congress found that when the uninsured seek medical treatment, many
either cannot or choose not to pay for the full cost of their medical care,
which subsequently shifts the costs to medical providers.95 Medical
providers must then impose higher charges, which shifts the unpaid costs to
insurance companies. 96 Insurance companies then raise premiums on their
outstanding health policies. 97 Thus, insured individuals incur higher
premiums, and are essentially subsidizing the medical care of those who
lack insurance. 98 The cycle perpetuates itself, as many who forego
insurance do so because of high premiums. 99
The current health care market depends upon the efficiency of “risk
pools.” 100 Theoretically, a functional system of private health insurance
spreads aggregate risk and cost uniformly across the insured population in
order for all individuals to receive affordable medical care when needed.101
When all individuals across a population are required to maintain coverage,
premiums should remain stable and predictable because the high costs of
unhealthy individuals are dispersed evenly throughout the entire
population. 102 Thus, in order to achieve material improvement in overall
health care access, insurers likely need to insure everyone, thereby
accepting more high-cost individuals, as well as more healthy individuals to
mitigate increasing premiums. 103 Without this efficiency, premiums would
be too high for large segments of the population to maintain adequate
insurance. 104

93. See Gostin & Connors, supra note 90, at 1188; Hunter, supra note 87, at 1974.
94. Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235,
1244 (11th Cir.), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 604, cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 604, cert. granted in
part, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011); see also 42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(F) (Supp. IV 2010) (estimating
that the cost of providing uncompensated medical care to uninsured individuals was $43
billion during 2008).
95. Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen., 648 F.3d at 1244; 42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(F).
96. Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen., 648 F.3d at 1244.
97. Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen., 648 F.3d at 1244; 42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(F).
98. Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen., 648 F.3d at 1244.
99. Id. In fact, one of the plaintiffs arguing against the individual mandate was forced to
drop her family’s health insurance policy “because the $1,100-a-month cost was prohibitive”
for a small-business owner. Emily Maltby et al., Hurdle for Health-Law Suit, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 5, 2011, at A3.
100. Gostin & Connors, supra note 90, at 1188; Leitch, supra note 9, at 179–80.
101. Gostin & Connors, supra note 90, at 1188; Leitch, supra note 9, at 179.
102. Gostin & Connors, supra note 90, at 1188; Leitch, supra note 9, at 179–80.
103. Gostin & Connors, supra note 90, at 1188–89; Leitch, supra note 9, at 180.
104. Lawrence O. Gostin & Elenora E. Connors, Health Care Reform — A Historic
Moment in US Social Policy, 303 JAMA 2521, 2521 (2010), available at
http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/384 (estimating that in 2008, 46.3 million
individuals in the U.S. were uninsured, and 25 million were underinsured).
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C. Key Provisions of PPACA
The central goal of PPACA is to help Americans obtain adequate and
affordable health insurance. 105
It aims to achieve this goal by
(1) expanding access to medical care by eliminating barriers to obtaining
insurance coverage, (2) increasing the role of consumers in selecting their
insurance, and (3) proscribing discriminatory practices of insurance
companies against those with preexisting conditions.106 More specifically,
reform efforts sought to eliminate medical underwriting and discrimination
based on health status in order to open the health insurance market to all
individuals, and consequently expand coverage to those with the greatest
need. 107 Congress believed that addressing these concerns would not only
decrease the number of uninsured, but could also lead to a reduction in
health insurance premiums, thus reducing the costs incurred industry-wide
from both medical underwriting and uncompensated medical costs.108
1. The Individual Mandate
The minimum coverage position, or individual mandate, is the focal point
of the debates surrounding PPACA, and lies at the heart of the Act’s
insurance provisions. 109 Beginning in 2014, this provision will require
most U.S. citizens, nationals, and legal aliens to maintain minimum
essential health insurance coverage. 110 Satisfactory coverage may be
procured through an employer, enrollment in government health programs,
or the purchase of an individual policy on the open market. 111 Failure to
maintain adequate coverage will result in a penalty of $695 per person (but
not exceeding $2,085 per family), or 2.5 percent of family income,
whichever is greater. 112
The law provides several exceptions to the minimum coverage
requirement. For instance, individuals with incomes too low to file federal
taxes will be exempted; additionally, an individual may petition for an
exemption if the cost of obtaining and maintaining coverage will exceed
8 percent of household income. 113 The law also contains exemptions for
incarcerated individuals, Native American tribe members, and those who
decline insurance for religious reasons.114 The law also provides a threemonth grace period before a penalty is imposed for lack of coverage. 115
105. Goldstein, supra note 87, at 73.
106. Gostin & Connors, supra note 104, at 2522.
107. Hunter, supra note 87, at 1974.
108. Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen., 648 F.3d at 1245–46.
109. Alec MacGillis, The Individual Mandate: How It Will Work, in LANDMARK, supra
note 2, at 85, 85.
110. PPACA § 1501, 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a)–(b) (Supp. IV 2010); see also Goldman,
Health Policy Brief: Legal Challenges to Health Reform, HEALTH AFF. (Oct. 31, 2011),
available at http://healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief_pdfs/healthpolicybrief_54.pdf.
111. PPACA § 1501(f), 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(f); see also Goldman, supra note 110, at 2.
112. Goldman, supra note 110, at 2.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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The individual mandate has been referred to as the “linchpin” of
PPACA, 116 and as Congress’s “magic bullet” to achieving near-universal
coverage and lower aggregate industry costs.117 Theoretically, the mandate
is an essential mechanism to achieve PPACA’s heightened regulatory
scheme without scrapping a market-based system of health insurance in
favor of a government-run single-payer insurance program. 118 At a basic
level of understanding, insurance operates by spreading risk. 119 For
example, Americans who receive health insurance through large employers
share their costs broadly across this pool, where older employees pay the
same amount as younger employees. 120 In the individual insurance market,
the spreading of risk did not function as efficiently prior to the passage of
reform because younger, healthier individuals could elect not to obtain
coverage. 121 Consequently, older, sicker participants comprise a large part
of the individual insurance market, as they consume a higher amount of
medical care. This skew in the participating population led to higher rates
in the individual market, making it even less likely that younger or healthier
individuals would decide to purchase insurance.122
Under the guaranteed issue 123 and preexisting condition 124 provisions of
PPACA, insurers are required to issue coverage to high-cost, unhealthy
individuals. 125 Unless healthy individuals are simultaneously required to
purchase insurance and become part of the overall risk pool, the private
116. See, e.g., Marc Siegel, The Individual Mandate Is Obamacare’s Linchpin, NAT’L
REV. (Aug. 15, 2011, 4:00 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/274576/individualmandate-obamacare-s-linchpin-marc-siegel.
117. Brief for Private Petitioners on Severability at 27, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v.
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2012) (Nos. 11-393, 11-400) 2012 WL 72440, at *27; MacGillis,
supra note 109, at 87.
118. Hunter, supra note 87, at 1974.
119. MacGillis, supra note 109, at 87.
120. Id.
121. Id. Approximately one-third of individuals aged 20 to 29 elect not to obtain health
insurance coverage. Id. This rate of non-participation is double that of individuals aged 30 to
64. Id.
122. Id.
123. PPACA § 2702(a), 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1(a) (Supp. IV 2010) (“[E]ach health
insurance issuer that offers health insurance coverage in the individual or group market in a
State must accept every employer and individual in the State that applies for such
coverage.”); see also id. § 2703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-2(a) (“[I]f a health insurance issuer
offers health insurance coverage in the individual or group market, the issuer must renew or
continue in force such coverage at the option of the plan sponsor or the individual, as
applicable.”).
124. Id. § 2704(a), 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-3(a) (“A group health plan and a health insurance
issuer offering group or individual health insurance coverage may not impose any
preexisting condition exclusion with respect to such plan or coverage.”); see also id.
§ 2705(a), 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(a) (prohibiting health insurance issuers from establishing
rules for eligibility based on health status, medical condition (both physical and mental),
claims history, prior receipt of medical care, medical history, genetic information, disability,
evidence of insurability, or any other health-status-related factor determined appropriate by
the Secretary of Health and Human Services).
125. See MacGillis, supra note 109, at 87 (“[I]nsurers argue, with justification, that if
they have to offer affordable coverage to people with serious medical conditions, then they
need to have younger and healthier people in the pool. And the only way to make sure that
those people obtain coverage is to require it.”).
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insurance market would have suffered from rising expenditures alongside
reduced income from premiums. 126 The mandate is considered by some to
be critical to mitigating those effects and to stabilizing the private health
Mandating that healthy individuals purchase
insurance market. 127
comprehensive insurance coverage would have the practical effect of giving
a $30 billion subsidy to insurance companies each year, thus affording
insurers the means to provide coverage to high-risk individuals at
artificially lower premiums. 128
Congress has also acknowledged in the Act itself that the individual
mandate is crucial to the Act’s overarching goals of expanding the
availability of affordable health insurance coverage and protecting
individuals with preexisting medical conditions:
[I]f there were no [individual mandate], many individuals would wait to
purchase health insurance until they needed care. . . . The [individual
mandate] is essential to creating effective health insurance markets in
which improved health insurance products that are guaranteed issue and
do not exclude coverage of pre-existing conditions can be sold. 129

2. Guaranteed Issue, Preexisting Conditions, and Community Rating
In order to combat the negative effects of discriminatory insurance
practices, 130 Congress enacted the guaranteed issue provision alongside the
prohibition on preexisting conditions. This provision forces insurance
companies to provide coverage to high-cost individuals by requiring
insurers to both issue and renew coverage to applicants without gaps and
exclusions in coverage. 131 This provision works in conjunction with the
preexisting condition exclusion prohibition, barring companies from
denying or limiting coverage to individuals based on health status.
As of 2014, the guaranteed issue provision requires insurers to issue
coverage to every employer or individual who applies in the individual or
group markets. 132 Insurers are also required to renew or maintain coverage
at the insured’s prerogative, 133 with limited exceptions such as fraud and
premium nonpayment. 134 Insurers will also no longer be permitted to

126. Id.; Hunter, supra note 87, at 1975.
127. Hunter, supra note 87, at 1976.
128. Brief for Private Petitioners on Severability, supra note 117, at 27.
129. PPACA § 1501(a)(2)(I), 42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(I).
130. The most controversial insurance practices include denying coverage for preexisting
conditions, or revoking coverage once an individual becomes sick. Alec MacGillis, The
Insured: It’s Status Quo — for Now, in LANDMARK, supra note 2, at 99, 101.
131. PPACA §§ 2702(a), 2703(a), 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg-1(a), -2(a); Hunter, supra note 87,
at 1974.
132. PPACA § 2702(a), 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1(a); see supra note 123 and accompanying
text.
133. PPACA § 2703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-2(a); see supra note 123 and accompanying
text.
134. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-2(b).
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refuse or restrict coverage based on an individual’s preexisting medical
conditions, or on the basis of health status.135
The community rating provision works in concert with the policy of
guaranteed issue to prevent insurers from using health status as a factor
when offering or pricing coverage. 136 Under the community rating
provision, insurers may only vary individual premiums within a geographic
area based on age and tobacco use. 137 Insurers are explicitly prohibited
from varying premiums within a geographic area based on health status. 138
This forces insurers to consider all enrollees as part of a single risk pool.139
II. SEVERABILITY OF THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE:
THE SPLIT OF AUTHORITY
Advocates of PPACA remain certain that the individual mandate is a
valid exercise of Congress’s constitutional authority, but assert that if the
Supreme Court were to disagree, principles of judicial restraint counsel the
Court to leave as much of the law intact as possible. 140 Opponents of the
law contend that the individual mandate is unconstitutional, and because the
mandate is integral to the overall goals of health care reform, the reform
legislation must be invalidated in its entirety. 141 This part scrutinizes the
debate over the individual mandate’s severability.
As of March 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit,
and the U.S. District Courts for the Northern District of Florida, the Middle
District of Pennsylvania, and the Eastern District of Virginia have found the
individual mandate to be unconstitutional, thus proceeding to the question
of the provision’s severability. 142 Of the district court opinions, the
Northern District of Florida held that the mandate was not severable and
invalidated PPACA in its entirety, 143 the Eastern District of Virginia found
that the mandate was severable and excised it from the remainder of the

135. PPACA §§ 2704(a), 2705(a), 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg-3(a), -4(a); see supra note 124 and
accompanying text.
136. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, 7, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S.
Ct. 603 (2011) (No. 11-393), 2011 WL 4479107, at *2, *7.
137. PPACA § 2701(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 300gg(a)(4).
138. Id. § 2701(a)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 300gg(a)(1)(B).
139. Id. § 1312(c)(1)–(2), 42 U.S.C. § 18032(c)(1)–(2) (requiring all health insurance
issuers to consider all enrollees in health plans offered on the individual and small group
markets as members of a single risk pool).
140. See, e.g., Consolidated Brief for Respondents, supra note 2, at 26–27.
141. See, e.g., Brief for America’s Health Insurance Plans as Amicus Curiae Partially
Supporting Certiorari Review at 15–23, Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 603 (Nos. 11-393, 11-398, 11400), 2011 WL 5128125, at *15–23.
142. See id. at 4, 11. For updated information regarding the status of all cases pertaining
to PPACA, see Defending the Affordable Care Act, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
http://www.justice.gov/healthcare/index.html (last visited March 23, 2012).
143. Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d
1256, 1305–06 (N.D. Fla.), order clarified, 780 F. Supp. 2d 1307 (N.D. Fla.), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part sub nom. Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,
648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir.), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 604, cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 604, cert.
granted in part, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011).
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law, 144 and the Middle District of Pennsylvania reasoned that the mandate
was severable but that additional, insurance-related reforms were too
intertwined with the provision to effectively remain in force. 145 The sole
circuit court to address the issue, the Eleventh Circuit, found that the
mandate was severable, and upheld the remainder of the legislation.146 The
discord in these opinions is a striking example of the uncertainty inherent in
applying modern severability doctrine. 147 These conflicting decisions have
compounded the immense uncertainty surrounding health care reform by
articulating four different potential schemes: PPACA as-is; PPACA
without the individual mandate; PPACA without the mandate as well as a
to-be-determined related set of provisions; and no PPACA at all.148
Part II of this Comment details the doctrinal conflict regarding the
application of severability to the individual mandate: whether a finding of
unconstitutionality means the mandate can be excised on its own, requires
additional excision of related provisions, or merits invalidation of the entire
law. This part begins by examining the arguments relied upon by
opponents of PPACA in arguing that the individual mandate is nonseverable. It then discusses the reasoning presented in favor of severability,
scrutinizing the conclusions that the mandate can be excised on its own or
that related insurance provisions must be excised as well.
A. The Argument that the Individual Mandate Is Not Severable
The argument for non-severability rests on the view that a statute is a
“carefully-balanced legislative bargain,” negotiated and crafted by Congress
in order to strike a “delicate balance” between vast and competing
concerns. 149 When legislation is passed in these circumstances, Congress is
deemed to be voting on an entire package, not on discrete provisions.150
Accordingly, an invalid provision should be dubbed non-severable if it is
essential to the central objective of a statutory scheme, because Congress
presumably would not have enacted the remaining statute if it fell short of
Congress’s overarching goal for the legislative package. 151
Proponents of non-severability find support for their conclusions in the
text of PPACA, both in its explicit language and its lack of a severability
clause. The text of PPACA counsels the provision’s non-severability by
overtly characterizing the individual mandate as “essential to creating
effective health insurance markets” where coverage is guaranteed and does

144. Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 789–90 (E.D. Va. 2010),
vacated, 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011).
145. Goudy-Bachman v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 1:10-CV-763, 2011 WL
4072875, at *19–21 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 13, 2011).
146. Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen., 648 F.3d 1235.
147. See Scoville, supra note 14, at 3 n.5
148. See Brief for America’s Health Insurance Plans, supra note 141, at 4.
149. Brief of Amicus Curiae Family Research Council, supra note 44, at 7.
150. See id.
151. Id. at 8.
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not exclude those with preexisting conditions.152 Thus, courts are arguably
required to give effect to this language as an explicit pronouncement of
congressional intent, the touchstone inquiry of whether an unconstitutional
provision can and should be severed. 153
Arguments that the individual mandate is not severable are buttressed by
empirical evidence indicating that implementing a guaranteed issue policy
without a mandate requiring all individuals to carry insurance will lead to a
so-called “premium spiral” that cripples the insurance market.154
Proponents and opponents of the law have indicated that a mandate
compelling individuals to maintain insurance coverage may be the only way
to avoid a premium spiral while ensuring compliance with policies such as
guaranteed issue and community rating. 155 Without requiring individuals to
carry coverage, individuals presumably would wait to obtain health
insurance until they required medical care.156 A mandate provision
minimizes this problem of adverse selection,157 and keeps premiums under
control by broadening the risk pool to include more healthy individuals.158
In arguing for non-severability, the insurance industry contends that the
Court should give great weight to the “backdrop of powerful proof”
presented to Congress indicating that implementing guaranteed issue,
community rating requirements, and preexisting condition provisions
without an individual mandate would destabilize the nationwide insurance
market. 159 Eight states had enacted insurance market reforms without an
individual mandate, and experienced an overall destabilization in the
market, most notably in the form of rising premiums and lower
enrollment. 160 For example, Congress was presented with data from New
Jersey indicating that implementing policies of guaranteed issue and
community rating without a mandate had initiated a premium spiral, leading
the individual insurance market to nearly collapse.161 Even if the mandate
is not “truly essential to comprehensive reform . . . Congress believed” it
was 162 based on the substantial evidence presented to it throughout the
legislative process. 163 Therefore, according to the insurance industry,
Congress intended the individual mandate to be non-severable, and courts
152. Id. at 21–22 (quoting PPACA § 1501(a)(2)(H), 42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(I) (Supp. IV
2010)).
153. Id.; see supra notes 53–58 and accompanying text.
154. John F. Sheils & Randall Haught, Without the Individual Mandate, the Affordable
Care Act Would Still Cover 23 Million; Premiums Would Rise Less than Predicted, HEALTH
AFF., Nov. 2011, at 1. A premium spiral occurs when healthy individuals wait to purchase
insurance until they actually require medical attention. This drives up overall premiums
because the only individuals carrying insurance are high-cost, unhealthy individuals. Siegel,
supra note 116.
155. See Siegel, supra note 116.
156. See Brief of America’s Health Insurance Plans, supra note 141, at 18.
157. See infra note 203.
158. See PPACA § 1501(a)(2)(I), 42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(I) (Supp. IV 2010).
159. Brief for America’s Health Insurance Plans, supra note 141, at 10–11.
160. Id. at 5.
161. See Consolidated Brief for Respondents, supra note 2, at 32.
162. Brief of Amicus Curiae Family Research Council, supra note 44, at 24.
163. Consolidated Brief for Respondents, supra note 2, at 32.
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should invalidate PPACA in its entirety if the provision is to be found
unconstitutional.
A finding of non-severability may also be supported by PPACA’s lack of
a severability clause, and the fact that two earlier versions of the bill had
contained one. 164 The absence of a severability clause may be significant
when one is included in earlier versions of the bill, but is later removed,
because “[w]here Congress includes limiting language in an earlier version
of a bill but deletes it prior to enactment, it may be presumed that the
limitation was not intended.” 165 Although not dispositive, it does counsel
the conclusion that Congress intended that the Act’s provisions “operate
together or not at all.” 166 This element of PPACA’s textual history,
coupled with Congress’s explicit assertion that the individual mandate is
“essential” to accomplishing the law’s target reforms, support the position
that the individual mandate is not severable.167
Further, advocates for non-severability state that if courts have
“significant doubt” about whether Congress would have enacted PPACA
without the individual mandate, there is a sufficient basis to invalidate the
entire statute. 168 Courts should “err on the side of caution” by doing so and
allowing Congress itself to reconsider the issue. 169 Invoking the principles
of institutional competence and constitutional limitations, courts are urged
not to excise invalid provisions if doing so would require rebalancing of a
complex statutory scheme, as this would constitute a serious encroachment
into the legislative domain that courts are neither permitted nor qualified to
undertake. 170
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida held that the
individual mandate provision of PPACA exceeded Congress’s power under
the Constitution, and that the mandate was not severable, rendering the
164. Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d
1256, 1301 (N.D. Fla.), order clarified, 780 F. Supp. 2d 1307 (N.D. Fla.), aff’d in part, rev’d
in part sub nom. Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648
F.3d 1235 (11th Cir.), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 604, cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 604, cert.
granted in part, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011). The two prior versions of the bill that included a
severability clause were H.R. 3200, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009), and H.R. 3962, 111th
Cong. (1st Sess. 2009).
165. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 22–24 (1983); see also supra note 44 and
accompanying text.
166. See Brief for Amicus Curiae Family Research Council, supra note 44, at 22 (quoting
Gubiensio-Ortiz v. Kanahele, 857 F.2d 1245, 1267 (9th Cir. 1988)).
167. Id. at 23.
168. See id. at 12.
169. Id. (noting that “if [courts] are satisfied that it would not, or that the matter is in such
doubt that we are unable to say what Congress would have done omitting the
unconstitutional feature, then the statute must fall” (citing El Paso & Ne. Ry. v. Gutierrez,
215 U.S. 87, 97 (1909))).
170. Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 329–30 (2006) (“Our
ability to devise a judicial remedy that does not entail quintessentially legislative work often
depends on how clearly we have already articulated the background constitutional rules at
issue . . . . But making distinctions in a murky constitutional context, or where line-drawing
is inherently complex may call for a ‘far more serious invasion of the legislative domain’
than we ought to undertake.” (quoting United States v. Treasury Emps., 513 U.S. 454, 479
n.26 (1995))).
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entire law unconstitutional. 171 In Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services, various parties, including twenty-six states,
two uninsured private citizens, and a business association, 172 challenged the
minimum coverage provision of PPACA. 173 District Court Judge Roger
Vinson granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs,174 finding that
Congress lacked the constitutional authority to promulgate the individual
mandate under either the Commerce Clause or the Necessary and Proper
Clause. 175 Further, Judge Vinson found that the individual mandate was
not severable, and, accordingly, held that PPACA must be stricken in its
entirety. 176
Judge Vinson articulated the severability analysis as consisting of a twopart test: (1) a determination of whether the remaining provisions can
function independently of the stricken provision “in a manner consistent
with the intent of Congress,” 177 and (2) an assessment of whether the
statute’s text or legislative history indicate that Congress would have
preferred no statute at all to a statute not containing the stricken
provision. 178
As to the first part, the court noted that a complex, lengthy statute with
hundreds of sections certainly has a number of provisions that are capable
of functioning independently of the individual mandate, many of which had
already taken effect.179 However, the court noted that the focus of this
determination is not a practical or technical inquiry, but rather one that asks
whether the remaining provisions will comprise a statute that is in
accordance with congressional intent.180
The court then addressed the Act’s lack of a severability clause.181 The
court acknowledged that the absence of a severability clause is insufficient
to raise a presumption against severability on its own merits, but asserted
that it still held potential relevance to the overall inquiry. 182 The court went
on to point out that the absence of a severability clause was particularly
significant to an analysis of PPACA, as prior versions of the bill did contain
one. 183 Judge Vinson reasoned that this meant a severability clause was
intentionally omitted from the Act as enacted, particularly since the
171. Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d
1256, 1305–06 (N.D. Fla.), order clarified, 780 F. Supp. 2d 1307 (N.D. Fla.), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part sub nom. Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,
648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir.), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 604, cert. granted in part, 132 S. Ct. 604
(2011).
172. Id. at 1263.
173. Id. at 1265.
174. Id. at 1307.
175. Id. at 1298.
176. Id. at 1305–06.
177. Id. at 1300 (citing Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 685 (1987)).
178. Id. at 1300–01 (citing Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130
S. Ct. 3138, 3161–62 (2010)).
179. Id. at 1300.
180. Id. (citing Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 684).
181. Id. at 1301.
182. Id.
183. Id.
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individual mandate was highly controversial throughout the legislative
process, giving Congress fair warning that legal challenges against the
mandate were likely. 184 Judge Vinson concluded that the ultimate absence
of a severability clause served as strong evidence that Congress believed the
Act could not achieve its overarching aim of health insurance reform unless
the individual mandate was included.185
The court further seized on the government’s statements conceding that
the health insurance reforms of PPACA could not survive without the
individual mandate.186 Legislative debates and presidential speeches were
all premised upon a goal of health insurance reform, and proponents of the
bill repeatedly stressed that the legislation was the “means to
In a
comprehensively reform the health insurance industry.” 187
memorandum seeking dismissal of the suit, the defendants stipulated to the
essential role of the individual mandate in achieving a “comprehensive
scheme [ensuring the availability and affordability]” of health insurance
coverage, and noted that without all of the health insurance provisions
working in tandem, regulatory reform would be ineffective. 188 Thus, the
court analogized the situation to New York v. United States, 189 where the
Supreme Court suggested that legislation should be struck in its entirety
where its purpose would be undermined by invalidation of one or more of
its provisions. 190 Judge Vinson concluded that the grouping of insurance
provisions embodied the core of the Act.191
Balancing these concerns and findings with the guiding principles of
severability enunciated in Ayotte, 192 the court found that “reconfiguring an
exceedingly lengthy and comprehensive legislative scheme” would be
inconsistent with the overarching aims of separation of powers and judicial
restraint. 193 If the courts were to sever the individual mandate from
PPACA along with the other insurance reforms, the inquiry into whether
each remaining section was intended by Congress to stand independently of
the individual mandate would be an extensive, time-consuming, line-by-line
analysis “tantamount to rewriting a statute” in order to ensure constitutional
184. Id. at 1301; see also Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23–24 (1983) (“Where
Congress includes limiting language in an earlier version of a bill but deletes it prior to
enactment, it may be presumed that the limitation was not intended.”).
185. Florida ex rel. Bondi, 780 F. Supp. 2d at 1301.
186. Id. at 1301–02.
187. Id. at 1302 (citing Morning Edition: Analyzing Democrats’ Word Shift on Health
Care, NPR (Nov. 17, 2009); News Conference by the President, July 22, 2009, WHITE
HOUSE (July 23, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/news-conferencepresident-july-22-2009).
188. Id.
189. 505 U.S. 144 (1992); see supra notes 64–70 and accompanying text.
190. Florida ex rel. Bondi, 780 F. Supp. 2d at 1303.
191. Id. at 1301 (“[T]he Act’s health insurance reforms cannot survive without the
individual mandate, which is extremely significant because the various insurance provisions,
in turn, are the very heart of the Act itself.”); id. at 1303 (“[T]he individual mandate is
indisputably necessary to the Act’s insurance market reforms, which are, in turn,
indisputably necessary to the purpose of the Act.”).
192. 546 U.S. 320 (2006); see supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text.
193. Florida ex rel. Bondi, 780 F. Supp. 2d at 1304; see supra Part I.A.
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conformity, and would essentially “second guess” what Congress would
want to remain in effect.194
The court concluded its assessment by likening PPACA to a “finely
crafted watch” containing too many dependent and moving parts for the
judiciary to “dissect out the proper from the improper, and the able-tostand-alone from the unable-to-stand-alone.” 195 Such “quasi-legislative
‘line drawing’” would be a serious encroachment into the congressional
realm; thus, according to the court, the Act as currently drafted is akin to a
“defectively designed watch” that must be “redesigned and reconstructed by
the watchmaker”—in this case, Congress, not the courts. 196
B. The Argument that the Individual Mandate Is Severable
1. The Mandate Is Severable on Its Own
Proponents of the individual mandate’s severability argue that
invalidating the entire statute is contrary to the traditional applications of
severability doctrine.197 Generally, courts presume validity and are
obligated to take objective measures to “maintain the act in so far as it is
valid.” 198 If a court does not attempt to preserve as much of the statute as
possible, it is arguably using its remedial powers to sidestep legislative
intent. 199 With the balance of a statute presumed valid, courts should
carefully scrutinize the remainder of the law and look for “clear evidence”
in assessing whether it can stand as fully operative as law, or if it is too
closely connected to the invalid provision that the rest also must be
Advocates of PPACA’s severability also contend that
struck. 200
eliminating the individual mandate would not have the disastrous effects on
the insurance market that many fear. 201 Some policy analysts project that
premiums in the individual market would indeed rise if no mandate were
194. Florida ex rel. Bondi, 780 F. Supp. 2d at 1304.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 1304–05.
197. See Brief of Nat’l Indian Health Bd. et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants
at 22, Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235
(11th Cir.), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 603, cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 604, cert. granted in part,
132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (Nos. 11-11021, 11-11067), 2011 WL 1461594, at *22.
198. Id. (quoting Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 652–53 (1984)).
199. See Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen., 648 F.3d at 1322 (acknowledging the judiciary’s duty
to exercise restraint in invalidating statutory provisions where it is uncertain whether such
provisions are in accordance with congressional intent).
200. Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae Supporting Complete Severability
(Severability), supra note 89, at 8. (“[T]he Court should have clear evidence that Congress,
faced with the unconstitutionality of one part of a statute, would have wanted some or all of
the remaining parts stuck down as well.”); see Brief of Nat’l Indian Health Bd. et al. as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants, supra note 197, at 24 (“If careful analysis is required
to determine that a particular provision of a statute is unconstitutional, it stands to reason that
the remaining portions of the statute, presumed valid, should also be scrutinized carefully
before determining if they are independent ‘fully operative’ provisions of law and therefore
remain valid, or if they bear such close connection to the unconstitutional provision that they
too must be invalidated.”).
201. See, e.g., Sheils & Haught, supra note 154, at 7.
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implemented, but estimate that approximately twenty-one to twenty-four
million additional people would be insured. 202 Additional provisions in the
law, such as subsidies and restricted open enrollment periods, would
mitigate the feared effects of rising premiums and decreasing enrollment.203
Thus, while the individual mandate would achieve lower premiums and
higher overall levels of coverage, it is not necessarily essential to achieving
the Act’s goals. 204
In Florida ex rel. Attorney General v. U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services, 205 the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court on this
point. Although the court affirmed that the minimum coverage provision
was unconstitutional, it held that the mandate was severable from the
remaining provisions. 206
The Eleventh Circuit found that the district court—the sole court to hold
that the mandate is non-severable—misapplied severability doctrine and
failed to adequately scrutinize the remainder of the law before making a
determination as to its validity. 207 The lower court had explicitly stated that
it had no intention of reviewing the entire law because of the “considerable
time and extensive briefing” needed to parse through such a lengthy and
complex statute.208 However, by failing to do so, the Eleventh Circuit held
that the lower court misconstrued severability doctrine and erred by not
maintaining the act insofar as it was valid.209 The Eleven Circuit went on
to note that a more thorough review of PPACA indicates that the majority
of its “myriad provisions” are wholly unrelated to private insurance, much
less directly linked to the individual mandate; thus, its excision does not
preclude the Act from remaining “fully operative as a law.” 210
In reversing, the Eleventh Circuit asserted that the lower court had
unduly relied on the lack of an explicit severability clause in PPACA in
finding that the entire 975-page law should be invalidated, with a heavy
202. Id.
203. Id. (“The primary reason for [lesser-than-expected effects on premium and coverage
projections] is that two-thirds of all people with nongroup coverage under the act are eligible
for premium subsidies and would be protected against much or even all of the premium
increase. This would reduce the coverage loss from lifting the mandate and restrain
premium increases in the nongroup market.”). The restricted open enrollment periods
mitigate adverse selection among individuals who would choose to forego obtaining
insurance coverage until they actually need it. These individuals would be forced to bear the
risk of any unforeseen insurance needs that arise prior to the next enrollment period; thus,
the open enrollment periods substantially raise the stakes for individuals who would delay in
obtaining coverage. See Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae Supporting Complete
Severability (Severability), supra note 89, at 36.
204. See Sheils & Haught, supra note 154, at 7.
205. 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir.), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 603, cert. granted, 132 S. Ct.
604, cert. granted in part, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011).
206. Id. at 1328.
207. See id. at 1323.
208. Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d
1256, 1304 (N.D. Fla.), order clarified, 780 F. Supp. 2d 1307 (N.D. Fla.), aff’d in part, rev’d
in part sub nom. Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen., 648 F.3d 1235.
209. See supra notes 171–96, 200 and accompanying text.
210. Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen., 648 F.3d at 1322.
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emphasis on a prior version of PPACA containing such a clause.211 The
district court had concluded that the removal of a severability clause during
the bill’s revision process operated as strong evidence that Congress
believed the law could not operate as intended without the mandate; in light
of established precedent regarding the weight to be accorded to the absence
of a severability clause,212 the circuit court held that such an inference went
too far. 213
The court pointed out that the drafting manuals for both houses of
Congress indicate that severability clauses are unnecessary unless they are
stipulating that certain provisions are non-severable; therefore, the initial
inclusion and subsequent removal of a severability clause should not
function as indicia of congressional intent against severability. 214 As such,
the circuit court held that insufficient evidence had been presented to rebut
the general presumption of severability, and, accordingly, that the district
court had erred in wholesale invalidation of the Act.215
The Eleventh Circuit went on to address whether invalidation of the
minimum coverage provision also mandated severance of the guaranteed
issue and preexisting condition provisions.216 The court framed the inquiry
as whether Congress would have enacted either of these two reforms had
the individual mandate not also been included. 217 It concluded that an Act
containing those two reforms was still in full accordance with Congress’s
intent to “make health insurance coverage accessible and thereby to reduce
the number of uninsured persons.” 218 The court also indicated that none of
the related insurance provisions contained any cross-reference to the
individual mandate provision, or stipulated their dependence on it.219
Further buttressing the independence of the provisions, the court noted that
the preexisting condition provision had already come into limited effect,
four years prior to the effective date of the individual mandate.220 A
legislative scheme containing both a guaranteed issue and a preexisting
condition provision “hew[s] more closely to Congress’s likely intent” than a
scheme that does not. 221
The court further emphasized that the question of severability is
markedly different from constitutional analysis, and that evidence in the
legislative history concerning the individual mandate was not strong enough
to overcome the presumption of severability. 222 The legislative history
211. Id. at 1322–23.
212. See supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text.
213. Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen., 648 F.3d at 1322.
214. Id. at 1322–23.
215. Id. at 1323.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 1324.
218. Id. at 1324–25.
219. Id. at 1324 (citing United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 260 (2005) (asserting that
where a statutory provision “contains critical cross-references” to an excised provision, that
provision must also be severed for similar reasons)).
220. Id.
221. Id. at 1325.
222. Id. at 1327–28.

2012]

SEVERABILITY OF PPACA’S INDIVIDUAL MANDATE

2261

indicated that the individual mandate increases the effectiveness of the other
insurance reforms, but simply because the absence of the mandate
“render[s] these provisions less desirable” did not lead the court to the
conclusion that Congress would have preferred that they not be enacted.223
Accordingly, the court found insufficient evidence to conclude that
Congress would not have enacted the two reforms without an individual
mandate; thus, the court held that the mandate was severable, and stipulated
that any alterations to a subsequent legislative scheme should be made by
Congress. 224
In Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 225 the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia also found the individual mandate to be
unconstitutional, and held that it was severable from PPACA. The court
recognized the plaintiff’s repeated contentions that the mandate was the
“linchpin” of the health care reforms, but concluded that a finding of nonseverability was inappropriate, as the law’s scope extended far beyond that
provision. 226
In coming to its conclusion, the court focused on traditional principles of
judicial restraint, institutional competence, and legislative preservation.227
PPACA had been hastily rushed to the congressional floor on Christmas
Eve for a final vote, and the court felt it impracticable to conduct the
required inquiry into legislative intent under these circumstances. 228 Based
on the insufficient legislative history and inadequate record before it, the
court stated that it could not ascertain whether Congress would have passed
the bill had the mandate not been included because such a determination
would have been impermissibly speculative.229 Accordingly, the court
elected to “hew closely to the time-honored rule to sever with
circumspection,” severing only the offensive provision and any directly
dependent provisions that make specific reference to it. 230
2. The Mandate Is Severable, but Requires Excising Additional Insurance
Reforms
As an alternative to their principal arguments, both opponents and
proponents of PPACA take a middle-ground stance regarding the individual
mandate’s severability. Opponents argue foremost that the provision is
unconstitutional and non-severable, and should therefore cause the entire
statute to fall; alternatively, they contend that if the Court is disinclined to
find the mandate non-severable, it should still strike additional insurance
223. Id. at 1327.
224. Id. at 1327–28.
225. 728 F. Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. Va. 2010), vacated, 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011).
226. Id. at 789.
227. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3162
(2010); Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 329 (2006); Virginia
ex rel. Cuccinelli, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 789 (citing Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S.
678, 684 (1987)); supra Part I.A.
228. Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 789.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 790.
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reforms that are related to the individual mandate. 231 Some proponents
principally contend that the provision is constitutional, but pose an identical
alternative argument regarding severance of the mandate and related
reforms. 232 This approach relies on similar arguments to those of nonseverability, but stops short of counseling invalidation of the entire statute.
Opponents and proponents alike argue that the individual mandate is the
“linchpin” of PPACA because it “ensures the cash flow into the insurance
market necessary to offset the resulting costs” of guaranteed issue and
community rating. 233 They assert that Congress would not have enacted
other insurance reforms that would “deplet[e] the market of funds” without
the primary revenue-generator for the market. 234 This argument primarily
rests on assertions that (1) the legislative history of PPACA indicates that
the provisions are non-severable, and (2) that, practically speaking, an
insurance market that employs guaranteed issue and community rating
policies without an individual mandate will suffer from adverse selection
and a premium “death spiral.” 235 Therefore, if the individual mandate is
found unconstitutional and severable from PPACA, closely related
provisions must be removed as well. 236
The Middle District of Pennsylvania adopted this middle-ground position
in Goudy-Bachman v. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.237
The court struck down the individual mandate as beyond Congress’s
enumerated powers under the Constitution, and found that the provision
was severable from PPACA; however, the court ruled that the mandate was
inextricably linked to the guaranteed issue, 238 community rating, 239 and
preexisting condition 240 provisions of the law, such that all three needed to
be invalidated along with the mandate. 241 The court primarily based this
decision on the fact that the minimum coverage provision functioned as a
partial funding mechanism for both the guaranteed issue and preexisting
231. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Family Research Council, supra note 44, at 29 (“[I]f this
Court invalidates Section 1501 but declines to invalidate [PPACA] entirely, this Court
should instead invalidate all the provisions of the Act that impact the cost of healthcare
premiums.”).
232. See Consolidated Brief for Respondents, supra note 2, at 10, 31 (“For the reasons
stated in its certiorari petition, the federal government believes Congress had Article I
authority to enact the minimum coverage provision. . . . In the event this Court disagrees,
however, the federal government believes it would be appropriate for the Court to consider
certain issues concerning whether additional provisions of the Act should be held inseverable
in this case. . . . The court of appeals did err . . . in holding that the guaranteed-issue and
community-rating provisions that will take effect in 2014 can be severed from the minimum
coverage provision.”).
233. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Family Research Council, supra note 44, at 29; Siegel,
supra note 116.
234. Id.
235. Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae Supporting Complete Severability
(Severability), supra note 89, at 24–25.
236. Brief of Amicus Curiae Family Research Council, supra note 44, at 29.
237. 811 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1110–11 (M.D. Pa. 2011).
238. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 136–39 and accompanying text.
240. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
241. Goudy-Bachman, 811 F. Supp. 2d at 1110–11.
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condition provisions. 242 Additionally, the government itself conceded at
oral argument that the preexisting conditions and guaranteed issues
provisions “[were] absolutely intertwined” with the individual mandate.243
Thus, the court found that a finding of unconstitutionality required that
those three additional components be removed from PPACA. 244
III. LIMITING THE SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM:
THE MINIMUM COVERAGE PROVISION IS SEVERABLE
Part III of this Comment asserts that the individual mandate is severable,
and that if the Supreme Court finds it unconstitutional, it should exercise
restraint and leave the remainder of PPACA in force.
Invalidation of PPACA in its entirety is not an appropriate remedy for
finding the mandate unconstitutional. The mere prospect that the Act’s
other insurance-related provisions may function less effectively in the
absence of an individual mandate is not an invitation for the judiciary to
infer that the ultimate success of the whole Act depends on one provision
out of several hundred. 245 The ambiguity of severability doctrine may
encourage analysis that supports one’s predetermined political view of
reform, 246 and the Court should be hesitant to employ such a drastic remedy
on a highly contentious and partisan platform.
Further, advocates of non-severability place undue weight on the Act’s
lack of a severability clause. 247 Congress could have easily included an
inseverability clause, particularly if removal of the severability clause was
indeed intended to rebut a presumption of severability. 248 The legislative
history of PPACA offers no indication of why certain prior versions of the
bill contained severability clauses, and “speculation based on nothing more
than [unexplained] congressional silence is properly regarded as
treacherous.” 249 This approach to congressional silence is particularly
salient in these circumstances, since both House and Senate drafting

242. Id.
243. Transcript of Oral Argument at 56, Goudy-Bachman, 811 F. Supp. 2d 1086 (No.
1:10-CV-763).
244. Goudy-Bachman, 811 F. Supp. 2d at 1111.
245. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
246. See Hunter, supra note 95, at 1973 (“In the subtext to those arguments [against the
individual mandate] are the radically different visions of the meaning of the social
obligations of citizenship that are fueling popular understandings and debates over the social
meaning of the new law.”); Pershing, supra note 9 (“Democrats say the constitutionality
argument [against the individual mandate] is a stalking-horse for . . . broader opposition to
reform.”).
247. See supra notes 211–13 and accompanying text.
248. Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235,
1324 (11th Cir.), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 603, cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 604, cert. granted in
part, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011).
249. Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae Supporting Complete Severability
(Severability), supra note 89, at 30. It is also worth nothing that the prior versions of the bill
that did contain severability clauses were not the bills that would ultimately become the final
version of PPACA. Id.
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manuals instruct lawmakers that severability clauses are not necessary in
proposed legislation. 250
Others contend that the individual mandate is integral to the related
insurance reforms of PPACA, and speculate that Congress would not have
passed these provisions had a mandate not been present. 251 This position is
not so summarily dismissed, but ultimately fails as well. Under
contemporary severability doctrine, the Court is bound by notions of
judicial restraint, and a particularized inquiry into the workability of
specialized insurance reforms is best undertaken in a subsequent endeavor
by the legislature. 252
Much empirical evidence exists to suggest that the functionality and
effectiveness of PPACA’s insurance market reforms depend upon the
presence of an individual mandate, 253 but countervailing evidence exists as
well. 254 The arguments for non-severability largely rest on empirical
evidence suggesting that insurance reforms will not only be ineffective, but
potentially catastrophic, if no individual mandate is included. This should
certainly give the Court pause; however, it is not for the judiciary to analyze
data and weigh probabilities regarding which scenario is more likely to
occur if the mandate is struck, or to comb through hundreds of provisions
determining which pass some unknown threshold of interdependence. 255
This is the task of the legislature, and not one for the courts to take up
retroactively on the legislature’s behalf. 256 Although PPACA’s insurance
reforms were designed to work in concert, and may in fact operate less
effectively without an individual mandate, it does not follow that Congress
would prefer a statutory scheme that reinstates an insurance market where
large numbers of individuals with preexisting conditions are excluded.257
There is also a significant body of evidence suggesting that excising the
individual mandate from PPACA’s reforms will not actually cause “death
250. Id.; see supra notes 214–15 and accompanying text.
251. See supra Part II.B.2.
252. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
253. See supra notes 159–63 and accompanying text.
254. See supra notes 202–04 and accompanying text.
255. See Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae Supporting Complete Severability
(Severability), supra note 89, at 34 (“[T]his kind of predictive factfinding about the interplay
of complex economic forces falls more naturally within the scope of legislative, rather than
judicial, competence.”).
256. Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae Supporting Complete Severability
(Severability), supra note 89 at 34.
257. See id. at 28–29 (noting that even if no general presumption of severability was
observed, “it would still seem appropriate for the Court to insist upon a clear indication of
Congress’s intent before concluding that the severability result most consistent with
congressional policy would be to deny coverage to many people that Congress indisputably
meant to help”). In support of the claim that the other insurance reforms are still capable of
achieving Congress’s objectives, the Department of Health and Human Services released an
annual report indicating that the Pre-existing Condition Insurance Plan (PCIP) saw a 400
percent increase in enrollment between November 2010 and November 2011. CTR. FOR
CONSUMER INFO. & INS. OVERSIGHT, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., COVERING
PEOPLE WITH PRE-EXISTING CONDITIONS: REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION AND OPERATION
OF THE PRE-EXISTING CONDITION INSURANCE PLAN PROGRAM (Feb. 23, 2012), available at
http://www.cciio.cms.gov/resources/files/Files2/02242012/pcip-annual-report.pdf.
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spiral” activity. 258 The role of the judiciary in a severability analysis is
limited to an examination of congressional intent, guided by an active effort
to maintain as much of the pertinent legislation as possible.259 Where such
a specific determination of legislative intent proves impossible or too
speculative, as here, the judiciary would overstep its own constitutional
authority by interposing its judgment for that of Congress.
The Eleventh Circuit’s respect and sensitivity to both the limited role of
the courts in invalidating legislation and the judiciary’s longstanding
preference for severability led to a proper application of the doctrine to
PPACA. 260 The court recognized that ascertaining legislative intent is a
speculative and largely evasive endeavor, particularly without the limited
helpfulness of a severability or non-severability clause. 261 These guiding
principles, as well as the difficulty inherent in determining congressional
intent with respect to a 975-page law, correctly directed the court to reject
wholesale invalidation of PPACA. The Supreme Court should reach the
same conclusion.
CONCLUSION
This Comment endeavors to provide guidance in navigating the murky
waters of severability doctrine, and how the doctrine should be applied to
PPACA. It does not advocate modification of current severability
principles—although the doctrine is certainly in need of clarification—but it
does encourage the Court to closely adhere to its articulated preferences for
presumptions of severability and principles of judicial restraint. Deviating
from these central premises, particularly in such a contentious and highly
consequential context, would amount to a drastic encroachment into the
realm of the legislature.
Because of severability doctrine’s malleability, it is especially susceptible
to interpretations that are based, intentionally or not, on the ideology of the
Justices. The Court should be especially wary of overreaching. In the
event that the Court finds that Congress exceeded its constitutional
boundaries in enacting the individual mandate, it should find the provision
severable and leave the remainder of the Act untouched. This result
comports with governing principles of severability doctrine as currently
258. See Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae Supporting Complete Severability
(Severability), supra note 89, at 38–41. Much of the evidence put forth in support of nonseverability relied on the experiences of several states who enacted guarantee issue and
community rating policies without an individual mandate, and subsequently experienced cost
spiral activity. See supra notes 159–63 and accompanying text. These states, however, did
not include an extensive program of subsidization and limited enrollment, such as the one
provided for by PPACA, and thus cannot serve as a reliable model for simulating or
comparing results. See Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae Supporting Complete
Severability (Severability), supra note 89, at 42.
259. See supra notes 85–86 and accompanying text.
260. See Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d
1235, 1320–21 (11th Cir.), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 603, cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 604, cert.
granted in part, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011).
261. Id.
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articulated, and shifts the burden of any required additional reworking of
PPACA’s provisions back to the appropriate government actor: Congress.

